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CHAPTER 16

BEHOLDING ··
NIETZSC.HE: ECCE HOMO,
FATE, AND FREEDOM
CHRISTA DAVIS ACAMPORA

THAT Ecce Homo, with its subtitle "How One Becomes What One is;' is Nietzsche's self-presentation of sorts seems rather easy to· conclude. But why does Nietzsche do this? What is
evident? What do we really learn from the work? Is it primarily a behind-the-scenes peek at
Nietzsche's thought, t.~e ideas that truly or actually motivated him? How complete is it as an
autobiography, given that it seems devoted largely to his writings?1 To what extent can we put
much stock in the account at all given that Nietzsche would slip into madness not long after
the first draft was complete and while still editing and revising it for publication?2 I hope to
shed some light on these common concerns about Nietzsche's Ecce Homo by focusing on
how the text bears on his controversial and seemingly paradoxical ideas about agency, fate,
and freedom in his presentation of the type he is and how he evolved. Ultimately, I think
the presentation of himself that Nietzsche advances in Ecce Homo offers evidence that he

' It has often been noted that Nietzsche's autobiography focuses primarily on his literary and
phi~osophical productions. EH has been read as a book about Nietzsche's books, about his assessment

of
his own writings, despite the title that announces the presentation of a life-homo, not biblio-and his
profession that his life and his books should not be confused (EH: "Why I Write Such Good Books" 1).
And there has been much attention given to the literary qualities of the text itself and what they indicate
about Nietzsche's views about literature as a model for "giving style to one's character" (Nehamas 1985; cf.
Sarah Kofman 1992).
2
Walter Kaufmann's editorial introduction and notes claim Nietzsche collapsed before completing
his revisions to the text. More extensive philological research has shown, in fact, Nietzsche continued
to make alterations to the text, including its concluding poems, as late as January 2, 1889 (Montinari
2003: 111), though the scholarly opinion is still divided on the question of whether Nietzsche
himself thought EH was finished and whether the text as it was published was that text or some near
approximation. Compare, for example, Erich Podach's claim "What is certain is that Nietzsche did not
leave behind a finished Ecce Homo, but we have one'' with Mazzino Montinari's: "What is certain is that
Nietzsche left behind a finished Ecce Homo, but we do not have it" (Montinari 2003: 120; Podach cited by
Montinari 2003: 125 n. 35).
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anticipates an achievable form of human freedom, 3 although it might be more limited than
what the Nietzsche literature sometimes reflects.

How ONE BECOMES WHAT ONE Is
,.
A host of questions arises from reflection on Nietzsche's citation and evocation of the
Pindaric maxim, "become what you are:' In the form in which it appears in the subtitle to
Ecce Homo-How One Becomes What One Is (Wieman wird, was man ist)-no paradox need
be evident: we could expect the book might have kinship with Bildungsroman literature,
providing us with that sort of account of Nietzsche's maturation. But, as Nietzsche uses the
expression in Ecce Homo and elsewhere, as for example in The Gay Science, it becomes more
problematic and less clear what he intends. About himself and kindred spirits, he writes,
"We want to become those we are" (GS 335), and in GS 270, he formulates it as an imperative: "you should become the one you are:' Zarathustra, we are told, "once counseled himself,
not for nothing, 'Become who you are'" (Z IV: "The Honey Sacrifice"). But how could we
become what we already are in any ordinary sense of those terms? Must it be that Nietzsche is
simply referring to what we (already) have the potential to become but which we have yet to
realize or make manifest?4 Ifwe already are such selves, how could we want to become them,
given that wants follow from lack or need? Moreover, if we already are such selves, how could
it possibly be that things would turn out otherwise, that is, that we might become in any other
way? And, just how does this curious imperative cohere with his other ideas, including the
notion of self as subjective multiplicity and his repeated prioritizing of becoming over being?
To gain insight into what it means to become what one is and why and how it is necessary,
we can consider an earlier account of the same that Nietzsche provides. Published nearly
two decades prior, its subject was Wagner rather than Nietzsche. 5 In his fourth Untimely
Meditation titled "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth;' Nietzsche endeavors to provide an account
of Wagner's development, his evolution: "wie er wurde, was er ist, was er sein wird" (UM
IV: 1). He depicts Wagner'~ "powerful striving" (UM IV: 2), his great struggles to identify his

3 Ken Gemes (2006) has recently argued that Nietzsche has an "achievement" conception of
freedom, specifically, that one becomes free in becoming a full-fledged agent, which is something
accomplished rather than a de facto human condition. In general, I agree, but puzzles remain about how
such accomplishment is possible. For example, the account appears to presume some sort of agency
for the achievement to occur (for it to be properly understood as an achievement rather than an event
or occurrence), and thus it appears to require at least some of the very powers that are supposed to be
lacking and serve as the basis for distinction. A similar concern is addressed by Robert Pippin (2009: 86;
see also p. 79 ). The puzzle persists in John Richardson's (2009) analysis in which he explores agency as
a capacity that arises in response to social demands and which acts like a drive and is capable ofboth
acting upon and interacting with other constitutive (largely antecedent) drives (2009: 137, 140-2). This
essay is my effort to contribute to this important discussion. See also the final chapter of my Contesting
Nietzsche, which incorporates and slightly revises some of the material that follows.
4 Alexander Nehamas (1985) discusses problems with this interpretation on p. 175.
s Although Nietzsche might beJhought to minimize Wagner's significance when he writes in Ecce
Homo that "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth'' is really about himself rather than Wagner (EH: "The Birth of
Tragedy" 4), it is nevertheless illuminating to explore the similarities and differences in these two works
because they provide insight into the process Nietzsche envisions as well as its (and his) task
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life's task and reconcile multiple parts of himself that were in great tension (UM IV: 8). It seems
clear that his struggle with and against himselfis a significant part of what Nietzsche thinks constitutes his achievement and serves as an indication of his greatness; it is largely what Nietzsche
discusses and what he ultimately praises. As we shall see, a curious feature of Nietzsche's account
of his own development in Ecce Homo will be' that he did not struggle, was not heroic in the way
he depicts Wagner, although he does describe his development similarly in terms of unifying
multiple, opposing drives.
•·
In his earlier work, Nietzsche sums up the story of Wagner's development as follows: "The
struggles that it depicts are simplifications of the real struggles oflife; its problems are abbreviations of the endlessly complicated reckoning of human action and aspiration" (UM IV: 4). This
gap between aspiration and action, and the necessary adjustment of aspiration to achieve reconciliation, mark an interesting contrast between Nietzsche's account of Wagner's development
and the story Nietzsche later tells himself about himself (EH: Interleaf). For Nietzsche's story
will have at least two features distinguishing it from Wagner's: Nietzsche "never struggled;' as
previously mentioned, and in contrast to Wagner's development, which was organized around
his various ideas about cultural revolution and himself as its instigator, becoming (Werden) of
the sort that Nietzsche finds interesting, requires that one not have the slightest idea what one
is. This opens a complicated set of issues about how Nietzsche thinks one becomes-what constitutes becoming and how one goes about.it. And it is relevant to a significant disagreement in
the scholarly literature as to whether Nietzsche is a fatalist or an advocate of self-creation.6 In
the works under review here we find crucial clues to what Nietzsche has in mind, for becoming
what one is appears to turn on making oneselfnecessary. Becoming what bne is involves becoming "not just a piece of chance but rather a necessity" (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 8). This is precisely what Wagner is.supposed to have done in his heroic struggles (UM IV: 6). But by the time
Nietzsche writes Ecce Homo, he sees himself as quite different from the man he clearly loved and
admired, perhaps above all others (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 3, "Why I Am So Clever" 5), even
as he remained his harshest critic (e.g., The Case of Wagner). In understanding how Nietzsche's
self-presentation of his development differs from that of Wagner, we also catch a glimpse of
how Nietzsche endeavors to become "powerful through Wagner against Wagner" (UM IV: 7).7
In Ecce Homo, against the backdrop of Wagner's exemplary evolution, Nietzsche depicts his
6

Brian Leiter (1998) reads Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical comments about the soul and concludes
that "there is [ ... ] no 'self' in 'self-mastery;' whereas Nehamas (1985) regards the self as something
that becomes by virtue of some special activity one engages in that allows for self-transformation and
transfiguration, self-becoming. Though these views seem at odds, perhaps it is a mistake to think that
we must embrace only one or the other. A third option might grant subjective multiplicity while locating
agency in the various powers of the contributors, claiming multiple agencies, as one finds in Parkes 1994
(e.g., pp. 320, 325), who claims Nietzsche presents a "a multiplicity [of subjective entities] behind which it
is not necessary to posit a unity: it suffices to conceive the multiplicity as a regency" (Parkes i994: 354; cf.
KSA u: 40 (38]). I find Parkes' account illuminating and supported by the text, but I think the pattern of
the organization of the drives, which he claims is fated, is not fixed, and I think there is potentially greater
unity than what his ultimate claim of the "play of masks" suggests, even though I recognize he thinks this
occurs on the basis of what he calls "enlightened spontaneity" (Parkes 1994: 459 n: 74).
7 The confines of this essay do not permit a fuller development of Nietzsche's relationship to Wagner,
although I wish to point out that it is more.complicated than often depicted. It is not an overstatement
to claim that Wagner influenced Nietzsche from the beginning to the end of his career, and he appears
by name or in the guise of a "type" in each and every work he wrote. While Nietzsche is immensely
interested in the lives and works of other persons he thinks are greatly important (for better and for
worse)-such as Homer, Socrates, Paul, Goethe, Beethoven, and Napoleon, to name just a few-only
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own development in terms of a tense opposition between fighting and loving, which Nietzsche
respectively links in EH to his wisdom and his cleverness.
Nietzsche begins Ecce Homo with reference to his "fatality" (Verhi:ingniss), and he concludes the work with a section claiming himself as "a destiny" (" Warum ich ein Schicksal
bin") . He uses this as an entry to explore his descent or ancestry (Herkunft), which includes
what is both "highest and lowest;' common and noble. Specifically, he focuses on what he
inherited from his parents and his "dual descent" (EH: "Why I A:in So Wise" l); he describes
his life as both ascendant and decadent (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 1). This accounts for the
fact that he is a "Doppelgi:inger" (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 3).8 His interest in inheritance
includes consideration of acquired resources, capabilities, and capacities, and the intensification or diminution of powers, temperament, and inclinations. It includes intellectual,
cultural, psychological, and physiological considerations relevant to his reception and
criticisms of evolutionary theory9 as well as his interest in atavism. 10 His first chapter, titled
"Why I Am So Wise;' focuses on the resources and liabilities he inherited from his parents.
At the same time, he diminishes their role in determining him when he writes: "to be related
to one's parents is the most typical sign of commonality. Higher types have their origins
infinitely further back, on which 'a t long last, an atavism must be unified, retained. Great
individuals are the most ancient individuals:' 11 This suggests that a higher type, as Nietzsche
conceives it, is someone who somehow accesses and taps other, ancient characteristics, and
is perhaps distinguished by virtue of the depth and reach of ancestral resources. Indeed, this
is how Nietzsche describes himself earlier in the same section when he writes, "But as a Pole
I am also an uncanny atavism. One must go back centuries to discover in this noblest race
of men pure instincts to the degree that I represent them:' 12 We find the same idea evident
in his UM IV, in which he links Wagner with Alexander, much as he suggests in EH that

Wagner is analyzed in such detail in terms of his development. Wagner becomes increasingly important
to Nietzsche after Wagner's death, at which time Nietzsche both writes his harshest criticisms and
professes his deepest affection for Wagner.
8
A preoccupation with genealogies, in te'rms of ancestry as well as the evolution and development
of values and institutions, is evident throughout Nietzsche's works in his analyses of other cultures and
types.of individuals. It famously underlies his account of the emergence and conflict of noble and slavish
morality and his examination of the modern European inheritance in Bbok VIII of Beyond Good and
Evil, "On Peoples and Fatherlands" (see especially BGE 264 and 268). There is considerable discussion
in the scholarly literature about Nietzsche's use of the terms Herkunft, Ursprung (origin), and Entstehung
(emergence), particularly as it relates to Nietzsche's conception and practice of genealogy. The most
famous, if not most illuminating, is Michel Foucault's "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1977). See also
Pizer 1990.
9 See Moore 2002 and Richardson 2004.
10
On Nietzsche's atavism, see Lingis 2000-i.
11
Translated by Greg Whitlock in Montinari 2003. The passage cited is part of a replacement text
he submitted for "Why I Am So Wise''. 3, when he returned the first and second signatures of EH to the
publisher on December 18, 1888. It do~s not appear in the Kaufmann translation on which I most often
rely. This passage is somewhat at odds with BGE 264, mentioned above, which underscores that it is
"absolutely impossible" not to embody the "qualities and preferences" of one's parents. These can be
reconciled if one grants that Nietzsche holds that one is not merely what one inherits most immediately
and that in higher types the ancient inheritances are enhanced and more pronounced.
12
Translated by Greg Whitlock. "Aber auch als Pole bin ich ein ungeheurer Atavismus. Man wii.rde
Jahrhunderte zuriickzugehn haben, um diese vornehmste Rasse, die es aufErden gab, in dem Masse
instinktrein zu finden, wie ich sie darstelle" (KSA 6: 268).
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"Julius Caesar could be my father-or Alexander, that Dionysus incarnate" in (EH: "Why
I Am So Wise" 3). This inheritance provides Nietzsche with a vast multiplicity of perspectives (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" l); it does not simply make him great. What distinguishes
the "well-turned-out person''. is that "He instinctively gathers his totality from everything
he sees, hears, experiences: he is a principle of selection'' (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 3). We
might consider just what this multiplicity is and how it becomes something that approximates something singular, something capable of being choosy in the way he describes someone who is, as he puts it, "basically healthy" (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 2) and has a hearty
constitution, as I explore in the sections that follow.
It is not just sheer multiplicity that makes a person rich on Nietzsche's account. Having
certain kinds of resources, particularly those that characterize opposing tendencies, so that
the strength of their opposition might become a resource, seems to be important to him.
Nietzsche identifies and elaborates the notion of subjective multiplicity throughout his writings. Consideration of those discussions allows us to see that he also distinguishes orders of
rank and orders of rule. Those ideas can help us appreciate why he distinguishes these parts
of himself in Ecce Homo, and how he thinks they became organized and productive in the
life he presents in that work.

"ORDERS OF RANK:' "TYPES:' AND
"RULING THOUGHTS"
Nietzsche repeatedly offers the view that individuals are composites or conglomerates of
multiple, competing drives, affects, and thoughts. These parts become organized, on his
view, in terms of "orders of rank:' Several "types" of such orders are discussed at length
by Nietzsche, including the types of the "master;' the "slave;' and the "priest:' 13 The "last
man'' might also be thought a type, and the Obermensch could be construed as an as-yet
unachieved type (human, transhuman, or more-than-human) .14 We can consider "types"
as distinguished by the general "orders of rank" constituting them. 15 What are ranked, as
Nietzsche considers such cases, are "drives" (Triebe), and the rank ordering reflects the relations of the drives: which predominate, which serve the others, etc.
Orders of rank characterize individual human beings (BGE 6), on Nietzsche's hypothesis,
such that he thinks who or what one is, strictly speaking, is this collection of drives in the
particular order or relation they are. There is no self either behind (i.e., other than) the ordering, or doing the ordering (see GM I: 13). But if this is what we are, then it is hard to see how
there can be anyone to appeal to in Nietzsche's Pindaric imperative to "become who you
are:' There should be no one "there" (in us) to answer a call to action, if indeed that is what
Nietzsche's imperative is. Is there another way to make sense of Nietzsche's insistence that there

See Richardson 2004 and 2009 for discussion of types as orders of drives.
For the view that Nietzsche conceives the Obermensch as a future (or at least more-than-human)
life form, see Loeb 2010. For the view that the Obermensch is neither a future life form nor a specific type
of human being but rather a set of attributes or capacities, see Conway i998.
is Brian Leiter attributes a "doctrine of Types" to Nietzsche {1998, 2002, 2007).
'3

'4
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is nothing to "us" other than the competing drives of which we are constituted while he repeatedly appeals to some sense of agency? I propose we look for such in Nietzsche's accounts of
how such drives are organized, how we are not merely a collection or group of drives but drives
organized in a certain way, characterized by a political arrangement, and how such arrangements can change and take on different characteristics. Orders of rank can be examined from
at least two related perspectives: in terms of their specific order, hjerarchy, or relative rankings
of the drives, as well as the way in which ruling or dominant drives relate to other drives. That
is, there is a political character to such orders, and this allows us to consider what rules, how it
rules, and how it came to rule. Indeed, in virtually all of his writings, we find Nietzsche exploring the nature and further implications of a conception of soul that follows from a notion of a
"social structure of the drives and affects" (BGE 12).
Thus Nietzsche regards human psychology as a good bit more complex than often recognized by philosophers, particularly in their representations of subjectivity and willing. VVhat
philosophers have designated as "will" is, (minimally) for Nietzsche, a coJnplicated and multidimensional process of interacting sensations, thoughts, and affects (BGE 19), which includes
awareness of various states ("away from which;' "towards which;' "from" and "toward" more
generally), thinking ("a ruling thought"), and affect (particularly "the affect of the command"
insofar as "a man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or
that he believes renders obedience"). Another way of accounting for willing as Nietzsche depicts
it is as shorthand for the processes of organization of an entity: what it senses as significant, its
orientation, and the structure of ordering it achieves (BGE 19).
Suppositions about the status of human freedom more generally are unwarranted on the
basis of this experi~nce, because what is perceived here is not so much the condition of the
whole organism in the world (an individual agent of activity) but rather an aspect or dimension of the interactions of the organism itself: "'Freedom of the will' -that is the expression for
the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same
time identifies himself with the executor of the order-who, as such enjoys also the triumph
over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his will itself that overcame them"
(BGE 19). 16 Yet, we neither simply nor solely command or obey. Willing is complex. We experience ourselves as individual, atomic willing agents when actually we are a composite structure
of wills and "under-wills;' which is another way of speaking of drives seeking to master other
drives: "we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying
party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion [...] we
are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic
concept 1"' (BGE 19; italics mine). Thus, our best evidence of our freedom- the felt perception
of freedom, our sense of ourselves as agents-is not indexed to our metaphysical or ontological
status but rather to the perception of one aspect of a complex process of organization: "our body
is but a social structure composed of many souls" in which some obey and others command
(BGE 19). 17 These structures of orders of rank and their discernible patterns comprise one significant, but not exhaustive, aspect ofwhat might be regarded as Nietzsche's interest in types.
}
16

See the interesting debate about whether Nietzsche's discussion of the will in BGE 19 is an account
of the phenomenology of willing (and linked with dismissal of the efficiency of the will) or an alternative
account of what constitutes willing and the circumstances in which it occurs in Leiter 2007 and Clark
and Dudrick 2009.
' 7 Nietzsche repeatedly refers to the idea of the subject as a multiplicity; see also GM I: 13. For further
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What constitutes a type in the sense discussed here is not only the particular drives that
comprise the social structure distinguishing an individual but also how those drives are
ordered and how their organization develops and is maintained-the ruling dynamic, the
form of rule that achieves and seeks to preserve that arrangement or ordering of drives. 18
Orders of rank themselves are also not absolutely fixed, not determined, and this is precisely what worries Nietzsche. Drives appear to be there from qie start, and seem to be
inherited and shaped historically. These can vary among different people and constitutions.
Constitutive elements and inheritances are fixed, but their relative strengths and orderings
are not. How, then, do they acquire their ordering? Nietzsche's account of himself as both
a lover and a fighter in Ecce Homo offers some indications of how this might be achieved,
and in the process (and in some cases) one becomes what one is by becoming a "necessity;'
rather than "a piece of chance" (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 8).

NIETZSCHE AS A LOVER: SELFISHNESS VS
SELFLESSNESS
In his chapter titled "Why I Am So Clever;' Nietzsche, finally, directly provides "the real
answer to the question, how one becomes what one is;' and it entails what he calls "the masterpiece of the art of self-preservation or selfishness" (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 9). Yet
this is a curious art, .pecause it does not include deliberate, conscious, active creation in the
way that "self-creation'' might be thought to require: Nietzsche claims that "to become what
one is" "one must not have the faintest notion what one is" (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 9).
How can we become what we are if we don't even know what that is, if we haven't the faintest
notion what that is? This clearly seems to support the fatalist interpretation that we simply
become what we already are, that there is no conscious planning or creating at work, and
thus there can be no imperative to action of self-creation and no special kudos to accrue if
and when one happens to succeed. 19 There is, according to Nietzsche, an "organizing idea''
that is "destined to rule;' which "keeps growing deep down-it begins to command; slowly it
comments by Nietzsche on the aptness of political organizations as metaphors for the subject, see for
example KSA 11: 40 [21], which is discussed briefly by Nehamas 1985: 181-2 (as WP 492).
18
For example, strictly speaking, the master and the slave in Nietzsche's On the Genealogy ofMorality
reflect different ways ofruling and not simply different types of people. Missing from Leiter's account
is discussion of "orders of rank;' and this idea that is so important to Nietzsche seems more relevant to
determining what one is than the "type facts" associated with such orders. The "type facts" themselves do
not determine what one does; rather they are themselves determinations of the rank order of drives. What
Leiter calls "type-facts" might be better understood as statements about conditions of a rank ordering
(rather than particular features of such orderings). Each individual is a myriad of type facts, which are
perhaps innumerable. They are fixed or determined in relation to the order of rank one is, not fixed or
determined for the entire duration of the life of the organism. Type facts themselves do not determine
but rather are themselves determinations of this ordering.
' 9 One might also place the emphasis on an implied restraint against our tendency to want to know
and to fabricate such answers that seek to unify conflicting and contrasting traits and characteristics.
This is explored at length in Gary Shapiro's chapter on Ecce Homo (1989 ), which emphasizes the
importance of the Dopplegiingerin Nietzsche.
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leads us back from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that will
one day prove to be indispensable as means toward a whole-one by one, it trains all subservient
capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, "goal;' "aim;' or "meaning'" (EH: "Why
I Am So Clever" 9).
One way of understanding what is meant by "destined" here is to see it in light of Nietzsche's
proposition of will to power (BGE 36): roughly, he proposes that all things seek the full expression of their capacities, the full measure of their powers. In this sense, what is "destined to rule"
is simply whatever proves strongest, whatever succeeds in enabling the multifarious drives to be
coordinated in a single entity. There is no separate faculty of will in itself that stands independent of the drives that comprise us, no will that adjudicates the inevitable conflict and contest of
drives we are, such that it could be said to be within our power to have things turn out otherwise. "Destined;' then, in this sense does not mean "predetermined;' that is, decided already in
advance of our becoming the particular organization of drives we are. Thus, in the particular
instance in question, "destined" is a loose way of speaking about eventual outcomes and does
not refer to any particular outcome that necessarily should come to pass (other than that what is
strongest determines the order of the others, since that is how strength is expressed).
But Nietzsche invokes stronger sen'ses of destiny elsewhere in his writings, including in
his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which is so central to his presentation and recounting of his life.
In that context and others, he makes reference to fate and links his philosophical practice
and axiological project of revaluation with loving fate, amor fati. 20 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche
writes: "My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to
be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal.it-all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessarybut love it" (EH: "why I Am So Clever" 10). This important idea to Nietzsche receives a
variety of treatments in the scholarly literature, and their consideration is beyond the scope
of what can be treated in this essay; I wish to focus here on just one sense of love as a form of
caring, which complements the general consensus in the scholarly literature that amor fati
minimally entails a certain form of affirmation. In Ecce Homo, love and fate are united in
Nietzsche's conception of selfishness and its role in his own development.
A major point of difference between Nietzsche's earlier account of Wagner's development
and his own self-presentation· of the type he is is found in Nietzsche's account of his own
selfishness, or self-seeking (Selbstsucht) .21 Rather than engaging in heroic struggles, as he

° Contrasting positions on Nietzsche's views about fate are evident in the different accounts given by
Brian Leiter (1999, 2007) and Robert Solomon (2003). For Leiter, what he calls "type-facts" play a "crucial
·role [ ... ]in determining what one does, even what morality one accepts" (2007: 9). While events are not
determined in advance for Leiter-and thus, there is no predestination in that sense-"facts" about a
person, which limit and determine a range of possibilities, are. Thus Leiter regards his view as attributing
a form of"causal essentialisrn'' to Nietzsche (Leiter 1998: 225). Solomon emphasizes distinctions between
fatalism and determinism, whereby determinism is focused on necessary causal connections and
fatalism emphasizes the necessity of eventual outcomes without commitment to any specific causes that
lead to such outcomes. Solomon thinks Nietzsche's fatalism is most closely related to ancient views, and
that it is decidedly not a form of determinism in the contemporary sense.
21
Kaufmann and others translate Selbstsucht quite reasonably as "selfishness;' but I think self-seeking,
conceived as part of a process of self-formation, is also appropriate. It resonates with the opening of
Nietzsche's On the Genealogy ofMorality, where he writes, "Wir sind uns unbekannt, wir Erkennenden,
wir selbst uns selbst: das hat seinen guten Grund. Wir haben nie nach uns gesucht,-wie sollte es geschehn,
dass wireines Tags uns fanden?" (GM Preface: 1).
.
2
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describes Wagner early on, Nietzsche claims he was particularly adept at self-preservation
(Selbsterhaltung), characterized in this text as selfishness or self-seeking rather than simply
self-perpetuation. This is the "ruling thought" he proposes in EH as an alternative to the ruling thought of morality and the ruling thought of Wagner, whom he saw as advocating selflessness. In UM IV, Nietzsche depicts Wagner as seeking.fidelity (Treue) above all else. This
loyalty was directed toward both the multitude (to be united as a "people;' UM IV: 8) and the
multiple and opposing parts of himself. It regards unity as a highervalue than any individual
needs or desires.
A long-standing concern in Nietzsche's works is what he regards as the morality of selflessness, which he thinks is ultimately life-denying and a symptom of decadence.22 He
attacks it repeatedly in Ecce Homo, as when he expresses his suspicion of the "so-called
'selfless' drives": "It always seems a weakness to me, a particular case of being incapable of
resisting stimuli: pity is considered a virtue only among decadents [ ... ] and sometimes pitying hands can interfere in a downright destructive manner in a great destiny" (EH: "Why
I Am So Wise" 5).23 But in his presentation of Wagner's evolution in UM Iv; the realization
of selflessness marks the pinnacle of Wagner's development: "we sense how the man Wagner
evolved: [ ... ] how the whole current of the man plunged into first one valley, then another,
how it plummeted down the darkest ravines. Then, in the night of this half-subterranean
frenzy, high overhead appeared a star of melancholy luster. As soon as he saw it, he named it
Fidelity, selfless Fidelity! [ ... ]Investing it with the utmost splendor he possesses and can realize-that marvelous knowledge and experience by which one sphere of his being remained
faithful to another. Through free, utterly selfless love, it preserved fidelity. The creative
sphere, luminous and innocent, remained faithful to the dark, indomitable, and tyrannical
sphere" (UM IV: 2). ·T his is echoed later when he writes: "For Wagner himself the event is a
dark cloud of toil, worry, brooding, and grief; a renewed outbreak of conflicting elements,
but all irradiated by the star of selfless fidelity and, in this light, transformed into unspeakable joy" (UM IV: 8). The kind of love he praises in his early text on Wagner is one that
involves completely relinquishing oneself. In the "soul of the dithyrambic dramatist" (which
Nietzsche claims for Wagner in UM IV and then for himself in EH), "the creative moments
of his art" occur "when this conflict of feelings is taut, when his gloomy arrogance and horrified distaste for the world fuse with his passionate urgency to approach the world as a lover.

Extensive discussion of Nietzsche's wrestling with and ultimate rejection of"selflessness" is found in
Janaway 2007.
2
3 Nietzsche repeatedly expresses the view that hostility to selfishness leads to decadence, declining
life: "The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. Instinctively to choose what is harmful
for oneself, to feel attracted by 'disinterested' motives, that is virtually the formula for decadence. [ ... ] 'I
no longer know how to find my own advantage: Disgregation of the instincts! Man is finished when he
becomes altruistic" (TI: "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" 35). Cf. NCW 7; TI: "The Four Great Errors" 2;
and for discussion see Muller-Lauter 1999a. Part of what is so problematic with pity is that it can motivate
us to conserve what ought to perish, and in Ecce Homo he presents himself as a physiologist who is
experienced in understanding organic degeneration and can apply those insights to psychological health.
Nietzsche writes: "When the least organ in an organism fails, however slightly, to enforce with complete
assurance its self-preservation, its 'egoism; restitution of its energies-the whole degenerates. The
physiologist demands excision of the degenerating part; he denies all solidarity with what degenerates;
he is worlds removed from pity for it. But the priest desires precisely the degeneration of the whole, of
humanity: for that reason he conserves what degenerates-at this price he rules:'
22
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When he now casts his eyes on earth and life, his eyes are like the rays of the sun which 'draw
up the water: collect mist, and accumulate towering thunderheads. Cautiously lucid and selflessly loving at the same time, his gazing eyes touch earth, and everything illuminated by this
binocular vision is compelled by Nature with frightful rapidity to discharge all its powers,
and to reveal its most hidden secrets" (UM IV: 7). Of course, Nietzsche takes a very different
view on Wagner in his later works. In The Case of Wagner, for example, Nietzsche accuses
Wagner of "disgregation;' being fundamentally unable to bring unitf to anything, offering
only the superficial appearance of development and form (e.g., CW 7, 10), merely stoking
up passions and emotions to achieve "effects" and overpower his audience; he seduces rather
than creates (CW: Postscript 1). But we can't simply trust Nietzsche in EH when he implies
that we might resolve the vast difference between his accounts of Wagner in UM IV and CW
by substituting the name "Nietzsche" where the reader finds "Wagner" in the earlier work.
Nietzsche offers readers a very different presentation of himself in EH, and it largely depends
on the differences he identifies in how one evolves, what it amounts to, and what it entails.
In contrast to his portrait of Wagner, Nietzsche presents himself as cleverly selfish, a theme
he treats repeatedly in works published after UM IV. Nietzsche highlights his "instinct of
self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]" (EH: 'Why I Am So Clever' 8), which he links with
his "art of self-preservation'': "In all these matters-in the choice of nutrition, of place and
climate, of recreation-an instinct of self-preservation issues its commandments, and it
gains its most unambiguous expression as an instinct of self-defense [Selbstvertheidigung]"
(EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 8). This is affected by and engaged with seemingly insignificant
matters of nutrition, place, climate, and recreation:
[T]hese small things...:....nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness- are inconceivably more important than everything one has taken to be important so far.
Precisely here one must begin to relearn. What mankind has so far considered seriously have
not even been realities but mere imaginings-more strictly speaking, lies prompted by the bad
instincts of sick natures that were harmful in the most profound sense. [ ... ] All the problems
of politics, of social organization, and of education have been falsified through and through
because one mistook the most harmful men for great men- because one learned to despise
'little' things, which means the basic concerns oflife itself. (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 10)

Looking after these "basic concerns of life" turns out to be important because we otherwise find ourselves expending immense amounts of energy fighting off harmful
conditions, and any ruling thought that distracted our attention from such concerns,
denigrated them as unimportant or inconsequential, would have potentially quite
harmful effects. Thus, an important dimension of how one becomes what one is is by
preserving oneself, conserving oneself from counterproductive resistance. Though our
constitutions may be determined to a certain extent by the drives that we happen to have,
and this is qualified below in important ways, we can nevertheless actively contribute
to our development by taking care of ourselves in very basic ways, which greatly affect
our capacities to act. In Ecce Homo and elsewhere, Nietzsche offers examples of a variety
of relations and associations that are informative of the type we are, including: inheritance; sensory experiences of smells, touches, and tastes; tempo; experiences with art; diet
and nutrition; biorhythms and times of day; conditions of climate, seasons, and weather;
geography and topography; nationality; physiological constitution and states of health;
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characteristics of dwelling places and domiciles; friendships and enemies; sexual relations; and forms of recreation.
The kind of selfishness he seeks to praise and revalue in Ecce Homo is not one that eagerly
seeks or depends upon exploitation of others. What he links with his cleverness and good
fortune in EH is much like what he describes as "ideal selfishness" in Daybreak SS2, where he
likens it to pregnancy and ripening. The same passage sheds further light on why it is important not to have the slightest idea what one is: "In this condition wl avoid many things without having to force ourself very hard! We know nothing of what is taking place, we wait and
try to be ready. At the same time, a pure and purifying feeling of profound irresponsibility
reigns in us almost like that of the auditor before the curtain has gone up-it is growing, it is
coming to light: we have no right to determine either its value or the hour of its coming. All
the influence we can exert lies in keeping it safe:' Nietzsche associates this with "a state of consecration" such that "if what is expected is an idea, a deed-towards every bringing forth we
have essentially no other relationship than that of pregnancy and ought to blow to the winds
all presumptuous talk of 'willing' and 'creating'. This is ideal selfishness: continually to watch
over and care for and to keep our soul still, so that our fruitfulness shall come to a happyfulfillment:' Such happy fulfillment, though, is not an end in itself that is merely self-serving and
self-satisfying; it serves and benefits others, as Nietzsche imagines it: "Thus, as intermediaries, we watch over and care for to the benefit of all; and the mood in which we live, this mood
of pride and gentleness, is a balm which spreads far around us and on to restless souls too:'
The kind of self-preservation that Nietzsche describes aims not at preserving sheer existence or mere survival but rather achieving a certain "self-sufficiency that overflows and
gives to men and ~ngs" (GS SS). Thus, Selbstsucht is not simply self-absorption or withdrawal, but rather is form of storing up for the purpose of enhancing expressive capacities
and sharing them with others. And just what might result that could be regarded as great?
Nietzsche provides insight to this throughout his texts, including in GS 143, where he claims
that the impulse "to posit [one's] own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joy, and rights"
becomes creative rather than destructive, as in the case of polytheism: "The wonderful art
and gift of creating gods- polytheism-was the medium through which this impulse could
discharge, purify, perfect, and ennoble itself; for originally it was a very undistinguished
impulse, related to stubbornness, disobedience, and envy:' Morality is opposed to it, but
the "invention of gods, heroes, and overmen of all kinds, as well as near-men and undermen, dwarfs, fairies, centaurs, satyrs, demons, and devils was the inestimable preliminary
exercise for the justification of selfishness and self-rule of the individual:'24 He links this
with freedom: "the freedom that one conceded to a god in his relation to other gods-one
eventually also granted to oneself in relation to laws, customs, and neighbors:' And in this
respect self-creation is possible, not in making ourselves whole, but rather in cultivating and
maximally expressing our creative powers, which allow us to project ourselves beyond what
we presently are: "In polytheism the free-spiriting and many-spiriting of man attained its
first preliminary form- the strength to create for ourselves our own new eyes-and ever
again new eyes that are even more our own: hence man alone among all the animals has no

a

4 Kaufmann's translation amended: "Die Erfindungvan Gottern, Heraen und Uebermenschen aller
Art, sawie van Neben- und Untermenschen, van Zwergen, Peen, Centauren, Satyrn, Diimanen und Teufeln,
war die unschiitzbare Varubung zur Rechtfertigung der Selbstsucht und Selbstherrlichkeit des Einzelnen:'
2
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eternal horizons and perspectives" (GS 143). Thus, Nietzsche regards selfishness as a means
to free- and full-spiritedness. In this respect self-preservation is a form of nurturance.25
The idea of selfishness is so important to Nietzsche that he returns to it in his concluding chapter in which he declares himself a destiny. There, the most "severe self-love" is
identified as "what is most profoundly necessary for growth'' and is contrasted with "the
'selfless: the loss of a center of gravity, 'depersonalization' and 'neighbor love' (addiction to
the neighbor)" and that which "would un-self man'' in which "un-selfing [ ... ] negates life"
(EH: "Why I Am A Destiny" 7). The evidence Nietzsche offers for this in this work is that
Christian morality teaches that the basic conditions of life-"nourishment, abode, spiritual
diet, treatment of the sick, cleanliness, and weather" are "small things;' trivial matters rather
than the most important. For Nietzsche, they are the most important, again, because when
we find ourselves in unsuitable states of affairs (unsuitable relative to our constitutions), we
are forced to expend great energy simply in fighting off what threatens our very existence
rather than being able to fight for something else (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 8). The nature
of this fightingfor and how and why it might matter are elaborated in Nietzsche's account of
his Kriegs-Praxis in which he presents himself as a kind of fighter.
Nietzsche proposes to revalue the meaning of selfishness and present an account of its
fruits in his presentation of himself in Ecce Homo. Self-seeking is proposed as a ruling
thought that might have an organizing feature and could counter the ruling thought of
morality. Orders of rule emerge in moralities in terms of the kinds of struggles they link
with the way of life they advance, their interpretation of the struggles of human existence
and their purposes, and the ways in which they encourage or discourage struggling more
generally, including what they designate as worthy struggles. Both the forms of struggle and
contest they promote and how they promote action within those contexts are relevant, and
in EH Nietzsche distinguishes struggles that are enervating-"when defensive expenditures,
be they ever so small, become the rule and a habit, they entail an extraordinary and entirely
superfluous impoverishment [ ... ] energy wasted on negative ends" (EH: "Why I Am So
Clever" 8)- from those that are invigorating. In reading Nietzsche's account of himself as a
fighter as he presents his Kriegs-Praxis, we come to appreciate how he thinks about productive expenditures as well as how he thinks about our active participation in becoming who
we are.

NIETZSCHE AS FIGHTER: KRIEGS-PRAXIS
Nietzsche's Kriegs-Praxis is an expression of the organization he is. It issues from an order of
rule that organizes his various drives and is expressed in his engagements with others and
their ideas. In articulating his Kriegs-Praxis, Nietzsche identifies what rules in him as well
as how it does so. This provides another window on how one becomes what one is. One does
not simply realize a potency that is already there, fully formed, from the start; nor does one
make oneself into something other than what one already is. Rather, becoming what one is

25

See also an earlier draft of the main concept for EH (1888), which focuses on the "problem of
nutrition'' [Ernahrung]; KGWVIIl.3: 24[1); cf. BGE 36; D 171; GS 347.
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is realized through an interactive process in which the constitutive rank ordering of drives is
achieved by virtue of a form of ruling expressed in engaging others.
Nietzsche's Kriegs-Praxis is a particular manifestation of a phenomenon that he thinks
is characteristic of all living things, namely that every "living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength" (EGE 13). This entails "Being able to be an enemy"-that is, being prepared to resist and engage combat and in a certain way, as we shall see-as well as "being an
enemy'' -that is, seeking out arenas in which such engagements can occur and participating
in them (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 7). Repeatedly, he links this with "Natur:' which might
suggest he thinks it is strictly the result of a particular type he already is. But that is not the
whole story, for it was not necessary that Nietzsche turn out to be a fighter; he became one
only because he sufficiently sought himself, sufficiently loved himself, realized his ideal selfishness, as described above.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes a strong nature as one that "needs objects of resistance:' In such cases what is wanted is "what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness,
and fighting skill" (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 7). The right sorts of fights provide conditions in which one potentially gathers and expresses one's strength. To achieve the conditions most conducive to this sort of activity, Nietzsche claims he applies four principles of
engagement. A brief survey of these provides a more complex portrait of Nietzsche's "practice of war" and how it constituted him as an author who produced the works he did: 26 ( 1) he
attacks causes or ideas and not individuals; (2) those ideas or causes have to be regarded
as "victorious" such that the struggle against them is of monumental significance; (3) he
attacks only that against which he lacks any personal grudges; and (4) his attacks are his
alone and not something done as part of some mass movement. 27
This gives some insight into what he thinks are healthy or invigorating kinds of fighting
in contrast with sources of resistance that are merely draining, destructive, and diminishing. The second principle indicates the importance of taking on a worthy competitor. The
engagement must truly test him if it is to bring out the best in him. It is important that he
strives to surpass what he engages rather than simply destroy or denigrate it. This latter
point is further advanced by the third principle, which prohibits utilizing these struggles
to settle personal grudges. The fourth principle concerning his individual pursuit might
be regarded as also contributing to the form of personal cultivation possible in agonistic
encounters. Mass movements do not necessarily require the same sort of personal investment. Concerning the first and third principles, we might question whether Nietzsche, in
fact, actually applied them. It is hard to see how Nietzsche's attacks on Strauss and Wagner
are not directed at the individuals, despite his claim in EH that he uses the names of persons
as indicative of types, as magnifying glasses for broader concerns; and it is hard to see how
Nietzsche's lifelong and repeated engagement with Wagner does not take on the character of
trying to settle a score. Nevertheless, in Ecce Homo as well as The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche
clearly states that he is supremely grateful for Wagner, cherishes his relationship with him
above all others, and he considers him a "windfall" for philosophy insofar as he provides

26

I have listed these in an order that differs from Nietzsche's because I do not think his sequence
indicates any particular priority.
2
7 Whether or not Nietzsche actually put these principles into action is another matter. I discuss these
concerns at some length in Acampora 2003b.
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an exemplary psychological type that crystallizes the problems with modern human beings
(CW: "Epilogue").
Although the confines of this essay do not permit extensive analysis of how, in challenging "problems [ ... ] to single combat" (EH: "Why I Am So Wise" 7), Nietzsche became
the philosopher he was and had the thoughts he did, we can note that this is precisely how
Nietzsche presents himself in Ecce Homo. In defining his problems, Nietzsche establishes
mammoth challenges that he sets out to surmount. He endeavors to slfow how these engagements required him "to stake all [his] strength, suppleness, and fighting skill;' and summon all of his abilities. These struggles not only tested qualities and capacities Nietzsche
already had but also facilitated his development of new or enhanced powers he would not
have had otherwise. 28 It is hard to imagine how Nietzsche's views on the task of the creative
affirmation of life, for example, could form without the contrast evident in his analyses of
the moralization and denigration of human existence he finds in Platonic metaphysics, for
example. Virtually all of Nietzsche's positive views are inseparable from the positions he battles such that his Kriegs-Praxis appears to play a significant role in shaping both what ideas
he expressed and how he did so.
Throughout Ecce Homo, Nietzsche clarifies and qualifies these principles as he repeatedly makes reference to how his agonistic practice unfolds and is evident in his writings.
He locates "the real opposition'' he generates in The Birth of Tragedy in his effort to fight
"the degenerating instinct that turns life against life;' which he contrasts with "a formula
for the highest affirmation, born of fullness, of overfullness, a Yes-saying without reservation" (EH: "The Birth of Tragedy" 2). He describes his Untimely Meditations as "warlike"
(EH: "The Untimely On.es" 1) and makes frequent use of martial metaphors, describing himself as "quick on the draw;' taking "pleasure in fencing;• making "attempts at assassination''
in which "paradise lies in the shadow of my sword" (EH: "The Untimely Ones" 2). He links
Human, All too Human with war, but he qualifies and distinguishes it as "war without powder and smoke, without warlike poses, without pathos and strained limbs" (EH: "Human,
All-Too-Human" 1). Concerning Daybreak, he writes that it is the beginning of his "campaign against morality;' but we see further evidence of his agonistic ethos as he emphasizes
his affirmative motivations and intentions when he claims he accomplishes his mission with
"no negative word, no attack, no spite-that it lies in the sun, round, happy, like some sea
animal basking among rocks" (EH: "Daybreak" 1).
It is possible to vanquish opposition by superseding it rather than destroying or committing violence against it, and this is what Nietzsche thinks he does: "morality is not attacked,
it is merely no longer in the picture" (EH: ."Daybreak" 1). Concerning his Zarathustra, he
explains that while it inaugurates a "revaluation of values;' which he also calls "the great
war" (EH: "Beyond Good and Evil" 1), his goal is not simply defeating his opponent but
rather creating a new entity, one in which "all opposites are blended into a new unity"
(EH: "Thus Spoke Zarathustra'' 6). In other words, Nietzsche's practice of his philosophical

28

Promising cases to consider are his agones with Homer, Socrates, and Paul, which arguably affected
Nietzsche's ideas about art and culture (the contest with Homer as the basis of his The Birth of Tragedy),
philosophy and science (the contest with Socrates as the basis of his views on philosophy and science,
particularly as evident in his The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil), and
morality and Christianity (the contest with Paul as evident in his On the Genealogy ofMorality and The
Anti-Christ). I discuss these at length in Acampora 2013.
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martial art aims to incorporate his opposition and not only to destroy or incapacitate it. 29
And yet, despite what he represents as the overall affirmative project of his writings, he
acknowledges that it is not solely creative and certainly not passive: "I know the pleasure in
destroying to a degree that accords with my powers to destroy-in both respects I obey my
Dionysian nature which does not know how to separate doing No from saying Yes. I am the
first immoralist: that makes me the annihilator par excellence" (EH: "Why I Am a Destiny"
2). So, destruction is an inevitable dimension and consequence, if'not a primary aim, of
his agonistic practice. This is so not simply as a by-product, as his remarks about the overcoming of morality suggest, but as a necessary condition: "negating and destroying are conditions of saying Yes" (EH: "Why I Am a Destiny" 4). This makes it challenging to assess
Nietzsche's Kriegs-Praxis both in terms of how well he applied his principles as he specified
them in EH and in terms of how they square with his long-term project to analyze and assess
oppositional structures and forms of organization, such as those evident in types. 30
In addition to elaborating his agonistic principles and their evidence in practice in his
writings, Nietzsche tries to account for the fitness necessary to engage his Kriegs-Praxis.
Nietzsche emphasizes he is resistant without being reactive. Thus, he thinks his exposure
to German decadence has the effect of strengthening him insofar as he resists it (EH: "Why
I Am So Clever" 6), but he claims he is not merely oppositional and defiant and he repeatedly
describes himself as "the opposite of a no-saying spirit" (EH: "Why I Am a Destiny" 1).31 He
describes himself as "full" of opposites, and believes a source of his strength can be found in
what it takes to coordinate the expression of (rather than simply unifying) such great diversity; he repeatedly champions his diversity rather than singularity of type. 32 To be sure, this
is not sheer diversity and individuality does not disappear. Nietzsche emphasizes how his
diversity constitutes a plentitude by virtue of his sublimation of differing tastes (EH: "Beyond
Good and Evil" 1). This sense of unity is more like a manifold than a synthesis. He directly
links the potency he acquires with enhanced capacities: "For the task of a revaluation of all
values more capacities may have been needed than have ever dwelt together in a single individual-above all, even contrary capacities that had to be kept from disturbing, destroying
one another. An order of rank among these capacities; distance; the art of separating without
setting against one another; to mix nothing, to 'reconcile' nothing; a tremendous variety that
is nevertheless the opposite of chaos-this was the precondition, the long secret work and
artistry of my instinct:' And yet, he claims there is "no trace of struggle;' no difficult challenge he sought to surmount ("I cannot remember that I ever tried hard"). In this activity,

9 On the importance of affirming (even supporting and cultivating) one's opponent in Nietzsche's
agonism, see Hatab 1995 and 2008, and Acampora 2002b and 2003a.
3° The argument that Nietzsche progressively developed and applied such analyses throughout his
career is advanced in Acampora 2013.
31 See also BGE 31.
32 Nietzsche also regards Wagner as a great mixture of types (EH: "Why I Am So Clever" 7). See
also the discussion of mixture and hybridity in BGE "On Peoples and Fatherlands:· The discussion
in the latter text, particularly, shows that Nietzsche considers such a condition with ambivalence. On
the one hand, he thinks it is a quintessential condition of modern human beings that they are great
mixtures of types and tastes and that largely this is deforming and incapacitating. On the other hand,
Nietzsche seems to think that such a condition might be potentially enhancing provided there is some
way of yoking the multifarious tastes in such a way that allows them to be individually preserved and
intensified.
2
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he refers to himself as "the opposite of a heroic nature"; "there is no ripple of desire:' But this
is because he has successfully sought himself, preserved and defended himself through his
practice of selfishness and self-protection. Thus, Nietzsche's account of his own becoming
suggests that it did not entail becoming something other than what he already is, or at least
that much was not his intent: "I do not want in the least that anything should become different than it is; I myself do not want to become different:'

•.

How ONE

BECOMES WHAT ONE

Is REnux

Nietzsche's presentation of himself as both a lover and a fighter suggests that becoming what
one is is a process that involves both more and less action on our parts than what accounts of
Nietzsche's philosophy sometimes suggest. It is less, because it is not a matter of us having a
definite plan, a fixed notion'of what we might become, or even sufficient will to bring about
an alignment between our ambitions and our actions, as Nietzsche seems to have previously
thought in his account of Wagner's development. It is more, because even though we can
neither change the particular set of drives that constitute us nor deliberately arrange them as
we might a bouquet of flowers or oil on a canvas, we can nevertheless influence whether our
constitutive parts take a form capable of powerfully expressing the organization it becomes
or whether we waste ourselves away through various forms of trivial and fruitless resistance,
remaining nothing more than a bit of chance. 33 Becoming what one is involves becoming a
necessity, and this is how Nietzsche depicts himself in his work.
How does one become necessity rather than a piece of chance? And what light does
this shed on Nietzsche's views about the human subject and its possibilities for freedom?
It seems odd to think that necessity is somehow optional or at least contingent. How could
necessity be anything other than-necessary? In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche repeatedly describes
his development in terms of "self-preservation" rather than self-creation, and he characterizes the former as a way of conserving and harnessing energy so that it might be used
for extraordinary tasks of the sort we find in his Kriegs-Praxis. Self-preservation consists
in cultivation, including disciplining oneself to avoid what is enervating. Becoming necessary, for Nietzsche, is a form of freedom, perhaps the highest form achievable by human
beings, because it entails becoming capable, becoming enabled, activated, and enlivened.
This conception of freedom as being-capable allows us to see how Nietzsche's views about
self-preservation and selfishness concern not sheer survival but rather a way of tapping creative powers. This allows us to see how both fatalistic and existential dimension~ are evident
in Nietzsche's works even though they are incomplete without their complement. 34
We have seen that Nietzsche thinks individuals are characterized by both orders of rank
and ruling orders that maintain them. Orders of rank are more than arrangements, because
there are also abiding relations (i.e., various ways of holding together and maintaining
such arrangements) that distinguish organizations. Constitutions are distinguished by the

a

33 Cf. EH: "Why I Write Such Good Books" 4: "multiplicity of inward states is exceptionally large in
my case, I have many stylistic possibilities-the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the
disposal of one man:'
34 See Nehamas 1985, especially pp. 177-86; and Leiter 1998: 255.
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relative strength of the drive or drives that are dominant and its (or their) expressive efficacy
and efficiency-that is how and how well it is able to order the other drives to pursue and
achieve its ends. 35 Organizations form on the basis of the nature of their constituent parts
(drives) and the kinds of possible relations that are thereby circumscribed. They are also
constituted in and through their external relations.
Nietzsche's presentation of his Kriegs-Praxis shows that he not only organizes fights, but
also, by virtue of that activity becomes organized; he becomes what he is. 36 His "practice of
war" is both expressive of the order of rank he is and 'effective in rendering that ordering so
that in the course of such activity he becomes ordered in a certain way. It is not, however,
the only relation that has this sort of constitutional character, and in Ecce Homo Nietzsche
identifies and refers to a variety of relations that are similarly (if not more so) constitutive, including nutrition, climate, geography, topography, friendship, and a variety of other
associations and experiences. Nietzsche thinks that philosophical (particularly moral and
religious) ideas can literally make us sick, physically decadent, and it is on this basis that
he anticipates that a revaluation of the body and all related dimensions of what is "this
worldly" (as opposed to otherworldly) might be reinvigorating, revitalizing. This is evident
in Nietzsche's discussions of a wide range of physical and sensory experiences in Ecce Homo
and other late writings and how they bear on psycho-physiological orders or constitutions.
This sheds light on how he envisions the dynamic development of physic-psychology and
how orders of rank emerge, develop, and change. 37
For example, when describing "why he writes such good books;' Nietzsche nearly always
mentions the places where they were written (e.g., St Moritz, Naumburg, Genoa), and he
frequently comments on the conditions of lighting and topography. 38 He mentions specific
locations where ideas "come" to him, such as his famous declaration about the origin of
the idea of eternal recurrence "6000 feet beyond man and time" in Silvaplana near Surlei
(EH: "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" 1).39 Nietzsche's Mediterranean experiences are virtually
inseparable from his writing Zarathustra: the climate; the proximity to sea and mountains;
the life-ways of the inhabitants, especially the fishermen; means of locomotion, health,
vitality, particularly in terms of constitutional fitness; and the typography, which provided
sweeping and vast "vistas" (EH: "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" 2). He associates these physiological and cultural experiences with his development of a capacity for feeling that he describes
35 Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick (2009) emphasize without elaborating the significance of
what they call "political authority" in organizations of drives. They write, "the viewpoint of the person
who experiences willing is constituted by, in the sense that it simply is, the viewpoint of the drives
who use the trappings of political authority to get their way in conflicts with the other drives" (256).
I certainly agree that "political authority" is an appropriate way to understand how Nietzsche conceives
the relations of the drives, but it is more than "using" "trappings:' The drives are successful on the basis of
their participation in the political arrangements. This means that no drive gets its way by sheer strength
alone; it is (and thus we are) inherently social and political all the way down, so to speak.
36 See Siemens 2006 for discussion of Nietzsche's "socio-physiology;' in which Siemens explores how
agonistic social relations can be constitutive.
37 For other discussions of how "small things:· potentially influence and affect orders of relations such
that we can see individuals as constituted in relation to their environments, see Domino 2002, Hutter
2006, and, in Nietzsche's own case, Krell and Bates i997.
J 8 Rich detail of Nietzsche's travels can be found in Krell and Bates i997.
39 Other examples in EH include his reference to the facts that "Songs of Prince Free Bird" was written
in Sicily, HAH was written in Sorrento, and D was written in Genoa.
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as the pathos of distance: feeling something below or beneath as part of a process of heightening that is characteristic of the pathos of distance, for example Christianity as beneath,
"altogether unheard-of psychological depth and profundity" (EH: "Why I Am a Destiny" 6).
Nietzsche claims this feeling gave him a particularly sharp sense of difference that facilitates
rank ordering, it provides the conditions that make possible the exercise of judgment concerning what is higher and lower, nearer and further, and which allows one, at least potentially, to achieve a new order of relation "within" and "without;' e.g.:·BGE 57.
Nietzsche appears to hold that there is a wealth of human resources, a trove belonging
to humanity as such, to the "household of the soul" (BGE 20), which one may tap, educe,
activate, and bring to life in the order one is. One of the ways in which we tap these resources
and facilitate their development and organization is through seeking out a variety of experiences and other relations that can make it possible to cultivate what he calls a "second
nature" early in his writings (UM II: 3). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche presents himself as doing
precisely this in his account of the dual (even triple) nature he heralds in EH ("Why I Am
So Wise" 3). What is significant is that Nietzsche does not simply claim the distinction of
having such a dual nature-much less willing it or simply creating or fashioning it for himself-he acquires it through experierices that access and cultivate resources that emerged
through larger related historical, cultural, and physiological evolutionary and developmental processes.40
In his Untimely Meditation "The Use and Abuse of History for Life;' Nietzsche describes
a process of change in which we "plant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second
nature, so that the first nature withers" (UM II: 3). This suggests a deep level of change is
possible, but we sho1.1:ld inquire into how it is possible, particularly given that we do not have
recourse to a true self or orchestrating agent behind the scenes who could be "responsible"
for such cultivation. Moreover, any desire for a second nature, for a reordering of the drives
that we are, can be nothing other than the expression of yet another drive that longs to be
dominant and thus we might wonder whether deeper is really the right way to think of it. 41
Wouldn't the dominant drive simply seek to reproduce itself albeit perhaps in a somewhat
different pattern or taking on a somewhat different form of expression of what is essentially
the same drive? If "nature" here refers simply to the nature of the dominant drive, then it
does not seem to be the case that the second nature is a distinction that makes a difference.
But if a being's "nature" is characterized by both the order of rank one is and the ruling order
that abides in its constitution and preservation, then perhaps a genuine difference can be
possible, not just because one wills it and not simply by force of accident or chance.
Acquiring a second nature or undergoing some sort of change in one's constitutive rank
order, we might imagine, is something quite rare and is not easily accomplished. In the first
place, rank orders are inclined to preserve themselves: they tend toward Selbsterhaltung, as
noted above. Moreover, that to which one is drawn to interact or interrelate reflects preferences that accord with desires one already has on account of the order one already is.

4° Nietzsche's works are replete with references to "what has been achieved in us:· not by dint of
our own will but rather "by nature:· He uses this formulation in a frequently discussed passage on the
"sovereign individual:' who is "permitted to promise" (GMII: 2). Robert Pippin's discussion (2009) is
particularly illuminating.
41 This idea is most clearly reflected in D io9, which numerous commentators cite. See, for example,
Parkes i994: 290-2.
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And yet, it does seem possible to change what it is that one typically wants, to develop new
desires as well as new tastes, and thereby to be drawn into new relations. While the orientations of the drives might well be self-preserving, the effect of new relations among them is
not entirely within any single drive's or collection's control. Organizations are constituted
by their activities in relation, both internally and externally, and these relations potentially
affect the ordering one is.
There are things we do that affect or influence the rank ordering we are, and these are
deliberate without being deterministic: we select climates, foods, natural and constructed
environments, friends, lovers, books, and music, etc., experiment with new and different
relations, try to develop new tastes and new loves, and stubbornly and relentlessly cling to
others. In sum, we are amidst a whole host of attachments, some of which can change and
expand. But the "we" here should be regarded as shorthand for "the order of drives that
constitutes us as agents, and the ruling order that abides therein:'42 That "we" that selects
and experiments is itself an order that has come to rule and be powerful enough to do the
selecting, and it will select in ways compatible with the orientation of the drive or drives that
prevail. It is the result of a process in which some parts strengthen relative to others, and
that ruling order henceforth interacts with others and potentially seeks to refine or refigure the order one is. In this respect we can see that change is possible, indeed likely, given
the complexity of the constitutive elements, which Nietzsche characterizes as involved in a
perpetual struggle for superiority over other drives and supremacy over the whole. In this
respect, I think it is appropriate to regard Nietzsche's view of types as dynamic and fluid
with considerable possibilities for change. This does not mean that any individual drive or
the whole itself deliberately seeks fundamental change; rather the individual drives pursue
only their further enhancement. The order is characterized by a certain manner ofruling. its
organization is maintained in a certain sort of way, which has been briefly explored above.
An important dimension to explore is how these constitutional characteristics can change,
evolve, dissolve, or devolve. There is evidence in Nietzsche's texts that suggests he thinks
they can and this explains his interest in more mundane, biologically material conditions
such as climate, food, domicile, topography, and so on. Like Socrates in Plato's Republic,
where we find the famous discussion of the different constitutions, Nietzsche is preoccupied
with exploring·how constitutional changes are possible and the role that philosophy might

42

In his discussion of the sort of unity that is possible for the assemblages that Nietzsche thinks
human beings are, Nehamas explores whether Nietzsche has in mind unity as coherence or unity as
numerical identity. He sees a much greater fluidity than I would grant in what rules in such orders with
the effect that they might be thought roughly to constitute some specific or distinctive collectivity. Here
is where Leiter's emphasis on types could be instructive if modified to pertain not exclusively or even
primarily to "type facts" but rather to orders of rank that consider both what is ordered and what rules
so as to preserve that order. What I find missing from both accounts is an emphasis on the nature of the
ruling that abides in the composite under consideration. See Nehamas 1985, especially pp. 181-2, and
Leiter passim. There is also significant disagreement between the two concerning how unity is achieved
in this multiplicity. For Nehamas, literature supplies an artistic creative model for producing the unity of
the self. For Leiter, it is simply given. Also instructive is Richardson 2009 on unity as "that synthesis of a
stable power-system of drives [ ... ] accomplished by a single drive taking control, and imposing its single
command" (135), though I do not see why it must be a single drive that does this rather than a regency or
oligarchy. The political and agonistic character of the soul indicates greater possibilities.
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play in bringing about such. In this context Nietzsche finds necessity, does not commit me to
either essentialism or sheer affirmation.
It is through and within networks of interrelations that the particular perspectives and
sets of orientations reflective of constitutive orders of rank come to be. As relations among
drives change, relative to the strengthening or weakening of drives, so too can the orders
of rank change relative to their more general orientations or how the more powerful drives
maintain their strength. What we call "I" is constituted, takes on a spe~ific character and
form, and becomes individual rather than a diffuse mix of competing forces in these contexts. One can, Nietzsche thinks, amplify, heighten, and pique such relations through a
variety of physiological, historical, and psychological experiences and relationships. Some
people appear to do this more readily and more ably than others. Predisposition to seeking
out such relations appears to contribute to the process while not determining it. In other
words, whether one becomes in a certain way does not simply reduce to whether one was
such a type from the start.
Thus, we can see that becoming what one is also involves becoming able to act as some
one entity that draws resources and gathers strength from having a great variety of dimensions. Becoming what one is, then, is also fr'o m many things becoming one. This is a form of
sovereignty, which for Nietzsche, at least in some contexts, refers to the form, efficiency, and
efficacy of the activity of ruling that characterizes the organization of the constitutive drives,
the order of rank one is.43 At the same time that Nietzsche undermines the conception of the
unitary, atomic, metaphysical substratum "I" (and in so doing emphasizes the multiplicity
of drives and the potency of their expression), he nevertheless envisions orders or forms of
ruling that give any particular organization integrity, durability, and expansive capabilities.
This makes it more than a mere collection of multiple parts that might be properly called an
individual. Nietzsche makes it clear he thinks persons are many things, that rather than a
singular agent there are many, but in great individuals, particularly, they are able to achieve a
certain form of coordination of that multiplicity that maximizes the expression of the diversity. Nietzsche expends great effort in examining effective and potent structures of ruling
as well as various possible ways of educating the drives and effecting new possibilities for
relations. It is an expressive activity that refers to the effective ruling of the order of rank
that constitutes a person and allows us to "become what one is." An explicit appreciation for
both orders of rank and means of achieving and maintaining such ruling orders is essential
to understanding how Nietzsche thinks about moral psychology and related philosophical
concerns. Fatalistic views conceived in terms of types are too rigid and too simplistic: we
are both orders of rank and ruling orders. Self-creationist models can too easily dismisses
the durability of orders of rank, and too readily overlook the fact that Nietzsche has undermined the very conceptual resources needed for the kinds of projects they envision. The
highly interactive activity of ordering is dependent not simply on acts of will but also on the
variety of relations of which we are a part, including "small things" that nurture us and the
actions we are thereby able to take.

42

This kind of sovereignty differs from that frequently attributed to Nietzsche on the basis of
interpretations of GM II:2. See my discussion in Acampora 2006.
43 This kind of sovereignty differs from that frequently attributed to Nietzsche on the basis of
interpretations of GM 11:2. See my discussion in Acampora 2006.
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